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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In West Virginia v. EPA,1 the State of West Virginia, twenty-six 
other States, and a variety of power companies and affiliates are 
challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) “Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources”2 on 
the grounds that, among other things, the rule unconstitutionally 
“commandeers” the States.3 The rule, known as the Clean Power 
Plan, seeks to reduce total carbon emissions from the power sector by 
32% by 2030, relative to 2005 levels.4 States are encouraged to 
achieve the reductions through state regulations, but if they decline to 
promulgate their own regulations, the EPA will implement the Plan 
by regulating state electricity generators directly.5 
West Virginia has argued that, even under the federal option, 
state officials would be forced to “facilitate the elimination or 
reduction of massive quantities of fossil-fuel-fired electric 
generation.”6 Because the EPA does not have the authority to 
regulate in these fields,7 the Clean Power Plan necessarily relies on 
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      1. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), filings and oral 
argument transcripts, https://www.edf.org/climate/clean-power-plan-case-resources. 
      2. 40 C.F.R. § 60 Subpart UUUU (2017). 
      3. See Brief for Petitioner at 78–84, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 
23, 2015), https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/solictor_general/Final%20Opening% 
20Brief%20-%20Core% 20Legal %20Issues.pdf. 
      4. Note: the Supreme Court has stayed the Clean Power Plan pending judicial resolution of 
the litigation. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016).  
      5. JONATHAN RAMSEUR & JAMES MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44145, EPA’S 
CLEAN POWER PLAN: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL RULE 2–3 (2016).  
      6. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 80. 
      7. Id. 
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the labor of state regulators to accomplish its ends.8 This reliance on 
state action, according to West Virginia, unconstitutionally 
commandeers the States.9 
Though the Clean Power Plan will likely be repealed,10 which 
would render the West Virginia lawsuit moot,11 the anti-
commandeering argument raised in West Virginia nevertheless bears 
further examination. Firstly, any future federal greenhouse gas 
regulation or legislation targeting the power sector will likely be 
subject to the same constitutional challenges. For instance, if 
Congress were to pass a carbon tax, it would likely create similar 
burdens on state regulators to monitor and enforce the provisions at 
power plants.12 Secondly, many other environmental and non-
environmental legislative and regulatory frameworks have similar 
incidental burdens on states.13 West Virginia’s novel anti-
commandeering argument, if valid, would substantially undermine 
the cooperative federalist framework of these programs. Thirdly, 
delineating the constitutional extent of the EPA’s authority to issue 
regulations like the Clean Power Plan would heavily influence the 
viability of certain litigation strategies to address greenhouse gas 
emissions, including federal common law nuisance claims.14 
 
      8. I assume for the purposes of this Note that the arguments posed by West Virginia are true: 
that the Clean Power Plan does heavily burden state regulators, and that the EPA could not 
accomplish its objectives without placing these burdens on them, even if it implemented a 
federal plan.  
      9. Commandeering, as it is used in this context, is a legal term of art that refers to the 
Federal Government’s cooption of state regulators or legislatures to implement federal 
initiatives, which violates the Constitution. See infra Part III.A.  
      10. See Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan, EPA (Oct. 10, 
2017), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-
repealing-clean-power-plan-0.  
      11. The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly granted the Trump administration’s motions to hold the 
case in abeyance while the Administration seeks to repeal the rule. See, e.g., Order Continuing 
Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, ECF No. 1703889 (Nov. 9, 2017). The court’s 
willingness to grant the abeyances indicates that it will dismiss the challenge once the 
Administration has completed its decision-making process.  
      12. See Jack Calder, Administration of a US Carbon Tax, in IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON 
TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, Chapter 3 (2015) (discussing the administrative challenges 
of implementing a downstream carbon tax).  
      13. See Respondent EPA’s Initial Brief at 104–5, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. 
Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (noting that federal regulatory programs that involve similar incidental 
burdens on states include state building permits issued pursuant to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, utility regulation orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
pursuant to the Federal Power Act, and many environmental programs, including the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act’s hazardous waste permitting program). 
      14. See Zachary Hennessee, Note, Resurrecting a Doctrine on its Deathbed: Revisiting 
Federal Common Law Greenhouse Gas Litigation After Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 
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Accordingly, this Note considers whether West Virginia’s 
argument – that a federal regulation that cannot be implemented 
without placing ancillary regulatory burdens on state regulators 
unconstitutionally commandeers the States – has any merit in the case 
law or the Constitution. This Note proceeds in six parts. Following 
Part I, this introduction, Part II summarizes the regulatory 
mechanisms and requirements of the Clean Power Plan and analyzes 
West Virginia’s anti-commandeering challenge. Part III discusses the 
two main cases establishing the anti-commandeering principle: New 
York v. United States and Printz v. United States. Part IV analyzes the 
historical, doctrinal, structural, and prudential underpinnings of the 
anti-commandeering principle and concludes that, though they exist 
in some tension with each other, the doctrine is best understood as a 
cost-benefit analysis, balancing the pragmatic necessity of broad 
federal power against state procedural autonomy. Part V applies this 
understanding to West Virginia’s argument and concludes that West 
Virginia’s position is inconsistent with the prudential and doctrinal 
rationales behind the anti-commandeering principle. Part VI provides 
some concluding remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Clean Power Plan 
The EPA finalized the Clean Power Plan on August 3, 2015.15 
The rule has not yet gone into effect because it was stayed by the 
Supreme Court in 2016,16 and the EPA recently published a proposal 
to repeal the rule.17 While the future of the Clean Power Plan itself is 
dim, a basic apprehension of the rule’s structural framework is still 
necessary to understand West Virginia’s anti-commandeering 
challenge to the rule, and ultimately, the constitutional validity of 
such a challenge. 
 
 
67 D.L.J.  (forthcoming, Feb. 2018) (arguing that doctrinal developments since AEP v. 
Connecticut have created a potential opening for federal common law nuisance claims targeting 
existing stationary sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, but that the viability of these claims 
depends in part on the extent of the EPA’s regulatory authority under Clean Air Act 111(d) – 
the authority EPA used to issue the Clean Power Plan). 
 15. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60 subpart UUUU (2017)). 
 16. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016). 
 17. See Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan, EPA (Oct. 10, 
2017), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-
repealing-clean-power-plan-0. 
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The Clean Power Plan targets carbon dioxide emissions from 
existing fossil-fuel-fired electric utility steam generating facilities and 
stationary combustion turbines.18 The goal of the Plan is to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions from the utility power sector by 32% by 
2030, relative to 2005 levels.19 Each State has a specified emission 
reduction goal based on its individual power mix and emission 
reduction potential.20 
The Clean Power Plan allows States to comply either by 
developing their own state plans, or by having the EPA implement a 
federal plan. Under the state plan approach, each State can select 
from two types of plans: (1) an “emission standards” approach where 
the State implements a federally enforceable emission rate standard 
directly on the targeted electric generating facilities and combustion 
turbines; or (2) a “state measures” approach where States attain the 
same level of carbon reductions through a mix of federally 
enforceable “emissions standards” coupled with other state law-based 
reductions like renewable energy and energy efficiency upgrades.21 
The “state measures” approach must also include a federally 
enforceable backstop.22 
Though the Supreme Court’s stay indefinitely postponed the 
Clean Power Plan’s implementation deadlines, the Clean Power Plan 
would have required each State to submit a state implementation plan 
outlining the State’s compliance strategy by September 6, 2016, and a 
final plan by September 6, 2018.23 Between 2022 and 2029, each State 
was to demonstrate incremental emissions reductions as outlined in 
the state plan.24 If a State failed or declined to submit a satisfactory 
state plan, the EPA would have implemented a federal plan directly 




 18. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662.  
 19. Id. at 64,665.  
 20. Id. at 64,664. 
 21. Id. at 64,667–68; see also RAMSEUR & MCCARTHY, supra note 5. 
 22. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,667–68 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60). 
 23. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,669.  
 24. Id.  
 25. RAMSEUR & MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at 3. The EPA has proposed a generally 
applicable federal plan but it has not been finalized. See Federal Plan Requirements for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64,966 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
Hennessee - Macros (Do Not Delete) 2/15/2018  5:30 PM 
Fall 2017] CLEAN POWER PLAN – COMMANDEER THE STATES 175 
B. West Virginia’s Anti-Commandeering Argument 
West Virginia and its co-petitioners have levelled a bevy of 
constitutional and statutory challenges to the EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan.26 The focus of this Note is West Virginia’s claim that the federal 
regulation unconstitutionally commandeers state governments and 
their officials.27 West Virginia claims that: 
Whether implemented by the States or the federal 
government . . . States will be required in both 
instances to facilitate the elimination or reduction of 
massive quantities of fossil-fuel-fired electric 
generation as there is no federal means of carrying out 
the numerous planning and regulatory activities 
necessary to accommodate the retirement of existing 
sources and the construction and integration of new 
capacity.28 
Thus, even if States opt out and the EPA implements its federal 
plan directly on electric utilities, “state actors will be the ones to 
account for the Rule’s impact on electric reliability, through such 
means as ‘[public utility commission] orders,’ and ‘state measures’ 
that make unregulated renewable energy generators ‘responsible for 
compliance and liable for violations’ if they do not fill the gap.”29 This 
would result in significant incidental burdens on state regulators, 
requiring them to “review siting decisions, grant permit applications, 
and issue certificates of public convenience for the EPA’s preferred 
generation sources and for the associated new transmission lines that 
the EPA’s transformation of the power sector will require.”30 
West Virginia argues that the EPA relied on state governments’ 
“responsibility to maintain a reliable electric system”31 in developing 
its Plan. Therefore, states have no choice but to participate in the 
 
 26. See LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480, 
CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. 
EPA, 10–16 (2017). The major arguments in West Virginia v. EPA can be broken into three 
categories: 1) the EPA violated the Clean Air Act § 111(d) by establishing emission reduction 
goals that included reductions “beyond the fence line” of the actual electric generating units; 2) 
the sources which are already regulated under Clean Air Act § 112, which include power plants, 
cannot also be regulated under § 111(d); and 3) the Clean Power Plan unconstitutionally 
commandeers and coerces the States. Id.   
 27. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 80. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 81–82 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,848 and 40 C.F.R. § 60.5780(a)(5)(iii)) (in-text 
citations omitted).   
 30. Id. at 82.  
 31. Id. (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,678).  
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implementation of the Clean Power Plan, even if they would prefer to 
opt out. The only way for them to avoid assisting in implementing the 
Plan would be for them to entirely remove themselves from the 
electricity sector – “one of the most important of the functions 
traditionally associated with the police power of the States.”32 For 
West Virginia, the choice between facilitating the implementation of 
the Clean Power Plan or declining to provide electric service for the 
State’s citizens “is no choice at all; it is an unconstitutional ‘gun to the 
head.’”33 
According to West Virginia, these burdens will frustrate state 
officials’ political accountability and exhaust their resources. West 
Virginia cautions that state officials “‘will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval’ for increased costs and lost jobs, because they appear to 
retain exclusive authority under state law over electricity 
generation.”34 
Before evaluating the question posed in West Virginia, a deeper 
understanding of the case law and constitutional underpinnings of the 
anti-commandeering principle is needed.  
III. THE CASE LAW 
Two Supreme Court cases lay out the foundation of the anti-
commandeering principle, New York v. United States and Printz v. 
United States.35 Taken together, these cases prohibit the Federal 
Government from requisitioning the legislatures and executive 
officials of the States.36 Below are the facts and holdings of both cases. 
A. New York v. United States 
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.37 The Act provided three sets 
of incentives to encourage the States to manage the country’s 
 
 32. Id. at 24 (quoting Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 
(1983)). 
 33. Id. at 79 (quoting Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) 
(Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion)).  
 34. Id. at 82 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992)). 
 35. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the doctrinal roots of New York and Printz.  
 36. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may 
not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory 
programs.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the 
authority to require the state to regulate.”). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq. (1986).  
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radioactive waste.38 While all three incentives were challenged, only 
the third – the “take title” provision –was found to be 
unconstitutional.39 The take title provision provided that States that 
did not arrange for the disposal of all internally generated radioactive 
waste could be forced to take title to wastes generated within their 
States, which in turn would require the State to assume liability for 
any damages the waste might cause.40 
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor found that the fatal 
flaw of the take title provision was that it forced the States to 
“choose” between to two coercive options: either the States regulate 
according to Congress’s direction and facilitate the implementation of 
federal legislation, or they assume ownership and liability for non-
state generators’ wastes.41 The Court stressed, “[a] choice between 
two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at 
all.”42 The Court noted that Congress is competent to enact regulation 
respecting radioactive waste and to preempt state regulations to the 
contrary and that it may use its spending powers to encourage States 
to adopt regulatory regimes.43 Nevertheless, “[t]he Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”44 Accordingly, Justice O’Connor 
concluded, “the Act [unconstitutionally] commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”45 
B. Printz v. United States 
The issue in Printz v. United States was whether a provision of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that temporarily 
required local law enforcement officers to perform background 
checks on handgun purchasers unconstitutionally commandeered the 
 
 38. New York, 505 U.S. at 149. 
 39. Id. at 177.  
 40. Id. at 175.  
 41. Id. at 176.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 188.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 288 (1981)). Justice O’Connor was careful to distinguish Congress’s power from the Article 
III Courts’ power to order state officials to comply with state law and Congress’s ability to 
“direct” state judges to enforce state law, which she said were mandated by the text of the 
Supremacy Clause and Article III. New York, 505 U.S. at 178–79. See also Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).  
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States.46 The Brady Act provision was arguably a softer form of 
commandeering than the take title provision in New York; it only 
acted on local officials and required them to assist in the application 
of federal law to private parties,47 whereas the legislation at issue in 
New York essentially required the state legislatures to enact state 
regulation.48 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, disputed the appropriateness 
of any balancing test, writing that: 
There is considerable disagreement over the extent of 
the burden, but we need not pause over that detail. 
Assuming all the mentioned factors were true, they 
might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the 
incidental application to the States of a federal law of 
general applicability excessively interfered with the 
functioning of state governments. But where, as here, it 
is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of 
the state executive, and hence to compromise the 
structural framework of dual sovereignty, such a 
“balancing” analysis is inappropriate. It is the very 
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law 
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various 
interests can overcome that fundamental defect.49 
In reaching this conclusion, Printz noted that the “[p]reservation 
of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is 
arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain 
fields than . . . by ‘reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist 
Congress.’”50 The fact that the law declared unconstitutional in New 
York addressed the whole State instead of individual officials, as in 
the Brady Act, was constitutionally insignificant.51 Accordingly, 
Justice Scalia held that “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, 
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch  
 
 
 46. 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997).  
 47. Id.  
 48. 505 U.S. at 174–75.  
 49. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (citations omitted).   
 50. Id. at 928 (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975)).   
 51. Id. at 930. In so holding, Printz rejected the legal fiction of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123, 159–60 (1908), in this context.  
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commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional 
system of dual sovereignty.”52 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ANTI- 
COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE 
As Justice O’Connor noted in New York, the “proper division of 
authority between the Federal Government and the States” is 
“perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law.”53 Because the 
Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has 
not been surrendered,”54 New York and Printz acknowledged that the 
answer to whether Congress can commandeer the state legislature or 
executive officials, respectively, is not readily ascertainable from the 
Constitution’s text.55 Instead, New York and Printz relied on three 
 
 52. Id. at 935.  
 53. 505 U.S. at 149. Chief Justice John Marshall would have agreed, writing nearly two 
hundred years earlier that the issue “is perpetually arising, and will continue to arise as long as 
our system shall exist.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).  
 54. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 55. E.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (“[T]here is no constitutional text speaking to this precise 
question.”). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia perplexingly suggested that the anti-commandeering 
principle might be embodied in a substantive limit imposed by the word “proper” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. See Printz, 521 U.S. 923–24. Justice Scalia cited an article written 
by Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger who argued that:  
the word ‘proper’ serves a critical, although previously largely 
unacknowledged, constitutional purpose by requiring executory laws to be 
peculiarly within Congress’s domain or jurisdiction—that is, by requiring that 
such laws not usurp or expand the constitutional powers of any federal 
institutions or infringe on the retained rights of the states or of individuals. 
Id. (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297–326, 330–33 (1993)). 
This reading is a significant departure from longstanding legal consensus. For instance, in 
Attorney General Randolph’s letter to President Washington opining on the unconstitutionality 
of the Bank Bill, he conceded that the word “proper” was more likely than not a surplusage 
“which as often proceeds from inattention as caution.” Edmund Randolph, The Constitutionality 
of the Bank Bill, No. 1, at 5–6 (1791). Chief Justice John Marshall thought that the whole clause 
was unnecessary, but that if anything, it should be construed as an affirmative grant of power to 
Congress to make laws incidental to its expressed powers. In his rebuttal to Judge Spencer 
Roane’s critique of M’Culloch v. Maryland, he wrote of the Necessary and Proper Clause: “if no 
other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove 
all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be 
involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble.” John Marshall, A 
Friend of the Constitution III, at 45 (1819). And though he reached the opposite conclusion on 
Congress’s implied powers, Judge Roane also thought the Necessary and Proper Clause was 
doing no work. Spencer Roane, Hampden II (1819). Perhaps for these reasons, Justice Scalia 
placed little weight on the word, emphasizing instead that “[o]ur system of dual sovereignty is 
reflected in numerous constitutional provisions,” and “[i]t is not at all unusual for our resolution 
of a significant constitutional question to rest upon reasonable implications.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 
923 n.13. 
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principal lines of reasoning in reaching their respective conclusions 
that federal commandeering of state legislatures and officials 
contravenes the Constitution’s federalism. They are, broadly: 
historical, doctrinal, and structural and prudential considerations. This 
Part considers and critiques each argument in turn. 
A. Historical Understanding and Practice 
New York and Printz both began their anti-commandeering 
analyses by reference to “historical understanding and practice.”56 
New York focused on the historical record and original intent of the 
Framers and concluded that “the Framers explicitly chose a 
Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate 
individuals, not States.”57 Printz agreed with New York’s analysis,58 
but, perhaps recognizing that the Framers were more ambivalent 
about the commandeering of state officials, focused instead on the 
evidence of historical Congressional practice.59 
In her opinion in New York, Justice O’Connor traced the anti-
commandeering principle to the transition from the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution.60 The Articles of Confederation, 
she noted, acted only against the States and not individuals, and this 
inadequacy “was responsible in part for the Constitutional 
Convention.”61 To Justice O’Connor, the Framers’ rejection of the 
Congressional powers outlined in the Articles of Confederation was 
evidence that the new Constitution was intended to enable Congress 
to “exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals, rather 
than over States.”62 
 However, while it is clear that the Constitution was intended to 
cure a defect in the Articles of Confederation by operating against 
individuals, it is not clear that it was also intended to preclude 





 56. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.  
 57. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.  
 58. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.  
 59. Id. at 906–09.  
 60. New York, 505 U.S. at 163.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 165.  
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many other issues of early constitutional law, people disagreed.63 For 
instance, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 27: 
It merits particular attention . . . that the laws of the 
Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate 
objects of its jurisdiction will become the SUPREME 
LAW of the land; to the observance of which all 
officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each State 
will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus, the 
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective 
members will be incorporated into the operations of the 
national government as far as its just and constitutional 
authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the 
enforcement of its laws.64 
On the other hand, Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, explained to the Connecticut Convention: 
“This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, 
states, in their political capacity . . . But this legal coercion singles out 
the . . . individual . . . .”65 Justice James Iredell broadly agreed, noting 
in his Observations on this Great Constitutional Question that “the 
Const[itution] intended all Laws of the U.S. . . . should operate upon 
Individuals & Not States.”66 
While many in the Founding Generation seemed to agree that 
the Federal Government should not requisition state legislatures, 
some of those same people were not opposed to federal control of 
state executives.67 In fact, some Anti-Federalists may have actually 
 
 63. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, American Federalism: Was there an Original Understanding?, 
in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (Mark Killenbeck ed., 2001) 
(suggesting that the Founders disagreed on the constitutionality and wisdom of 
commandeering).  
 64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 174–75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasis omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (stating that it 
was “extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial 
power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the 
Union”).  
 65. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 197 (2d ed. 1863). 
 66. James Iredell, Observations on this Great Constitutional Question, 27 (1793). This 
document appears to have been a draft of Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia. He 
ultimately omitted most of his discussion of state sovereignty, instead limiting his opinion to the 
contention that the Judiciary Act of 1789 failed to prescribe a process for hearing the case. 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).  
 67. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1960 (1993) 
(“Though the Founding Generation did not wish to permit coercion of states in their sovereign, 
legislative capacities, many individuals envisioned federal commandeering of state executive 
officers. Apparently, they saw no inconsistency in abandoning federal commandeering of state 
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supported federal commandeering of state officials as a means of 
preserving state power, both by ensuring local control over federal 
regulation and preventing federal patronage from shifting the 
loyalties of state officials and the people to the Federal 
Government.68 Under this view, Hamilton’s The Federalist No 27, far 
from being “the most expansive view of federal authority ever 
expressed,”69 was actually a concession to the opponents of overly 
centralized federal power. 
The lessons of modern cooperative federalism legislation – where 
the federal and state governments share control over the 
implementation of federal statutes – appear to lend credence to the 
Anti-Federalists’ vision of commandeering.70 In these cooperative 
arrangements, the Federal Government depends on the States to 
implement its policies. States, in turn, “use [the] regulatory power 
conferred by the Federal Government to tweak, challenge, and even 
dissent from federal law.”71 
Because Justice Scalia was probably cognizant of the fact that the 
Founders were not unanimous in the view that Congress cannot 
commandeer state executives, he focused his historical arguments in 
Printz on the “enactments of the early Congresses.”72 The Justice 
noted that “almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance 
of the practice” was persuasive evidence of the fact that 
 
legislatures while at the same time permitting federal commandeering of state executives.”).   
 68. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 
1104, 1108–12 (2013). 
 69. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997). Justice Scalia also attempted to 
cabin the passage, asserting that all it required was that States “enact, enforce, and interpret 
state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law.” Id. at 913. Citing an 
earlier dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor’s, Justice Scalia argued that any language to the 
contrary “appear[ed] to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing 
their officials to assist the Federal Government.” Id. at 910–11.  
 70. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1298 (2009).  
 71. Id. at 1259.  
 72. Printz, 521 U.S. at 909. Of course, the Founding Generation disagreed on the 
Constitutional value of legislative practice. Compare James Madison, Letter to Charles Jared 
Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2374 
(explaining that he decided not to veto the second Bank Bill despite having opposed the original 
Bank Bill because “the uniform sanction of successive legislative bodies, through a period of 
years and under the varied ascendency of parties” amounted to “the requisite evidence of the 
national judgment and intention”) with Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 28 (1815) (opinion of Roane, 
J.) (“With respect to the opinions of the members of congress, who passed the judicial act, I had 
not expected that they would have been quoted, to prove it constitutional. Their opinion was 
already manifest, in the act itself . . . The reiterated opinions of the same men, gains nothing, on 
this question of constitutionality . . . .”).  
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commandeering was unconstitutional.73 On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the First Congress avoided commandeering state 
executives simply because it did not trust state executives to 
implement federal law faithfully, and not because of any 
constitutional impediment.74 It is true though, that as an historical 
matter, Congress did not generally force state executives or 
legislatures to implement its agenda.75 And the judiciary, it seems, 
eventually took note. 
B. Doctrinal Foundations 
New York and Printz both sought to ground their holdings in 
Supreme Court precedent. However, while the anti-commandeering 
principle has historical precedent in the Supreme Court’s case law, it 
was not the dominant view of the Court in the early days. It was not 
until the mid-1800s that the Court held that the Constitution does not 
act against the States in their sovereign capacity. Even then, the anti-
commandeering principle did not coalesce into a formal doctrine until 
the 1980s. 
The nation’s early judges were sharply divided as to the extent of 
the Federal Government’s powers over the States.76 Perhaps the most 
illuminating example was the early constitutional crisis that 
culminated in the Supreme Court’s influential decision in 1816, 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,77 in which the Court considered whether 
 
 73. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.  
 74. See Campbell, supra note 68, at 1144–45 (noting Federalist apprehension around using 
state officers to enforce federal laws, as urged by Anti-Federalists who pointed to law and oaths 
that bound state officers). 
 75. The early Congresses did enact two groups of laws that imposed obligations on state 
officials to implement federal law: laws requiring state judges to enforce federal law; and the 
Extradition Act of 1793, which required state executives to return fugitives from other states at 
the behest of those states. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907–09. But, as Justice Scalia observed, both 
groups of laws are textually permitted by the Supremacy Clause and the Extradition Clause, 
respectively. Id.   
 76. The seriatim opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793) are 
illuminative of this lack of consensus. Justice Wilson, for instance, concluded that both the text 
and spirit of the Constitution demonstrated that the People rendered the States subordinate to 
the Federal Government. Id. at 454–55. Chief Justice Jay, in an opinion that might have been 
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes more than a century later, wrote that it was absurd to 
subject cities but not States to suit when there was no practical difference between them, asking: 
“In this land of equal liberty, shall forty odd thousand in one place be compellable to do justice, 
and yet fifty odd thousand in another place be privileged to do justice only as they may think 
proper?” Id. at 472–73. On the other hand, Justice Iredell, in his draft dissenting opinion, argued 
that a suit against a State would be “inconsistent with its Sovereign Character.” Iredell, supra 
note 66, at 25.  
 77. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).  
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the Virginia Appeals Court was required to follow the United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.78 In the case leading 
up to Martin, Hunter v. Martin,79 the Virginia Appeals Court reversed 
the state trial court, which had thought itself bound by a prior 
judgment of the Supreme Court, and held that the Supreme Court 
had no power to compel the state courts. In his seriatim opinion for 
the Virginia Appeals Court, Judge Cabell articulated a strikingly 
modern version of process federalism. He observed that the 
substantive powers of the State and Federal Governments overlap 
considerably – both governments have jurisdiction over the same 
territories and people, and “frequently [legislate] on the same 
subjects.”80 However, Judge Cabell noted that the “system [would be] 
deranged” if there can be no meaningful separation between the two 
governments.81 Instead of attempting to carve out separate 
substantive spheres for the Federal and State Governments, Judge 
Cabell’s solution was procedural. “[E]ach government,” he noted, 
“must act by its own organs: from no other can it expect, command, or 
enforce obedience, even as to objects coming within the range of its 
powers.”82 Thus, Judge Cabell created a procedural solution for 
maintaining a distinction between the State and Federal 
Governments by preventing either from controlling the other, while 
recognizing the inevitable substantive overlap of the two 
governments’ legislative prerogatives. 
Writing for the Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story 
rejected Judge Cabell’s process federalism, both on textual and 
structural grounds. According to Justice Story, the Supreme Court’s 
power to review State court decisions stems not just from Article III 
but also from the distinctly national texture of the Constitution 
itself.83 Because it was the People and not the States that endowed the 
Constitution with its powers, the People had the “right to . . . make 
the powers of the state governments, in given cases, subordinate to 
 
 78. Id. at 305–06. The holding in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee is not directly in tension with 
New York and Printz, as it concerned only the Judiciary’s Article III power whereas New York 
and Printz only addressed Congress’s Article I power. 
 79. 18 Va. 1 (1815).  
 80. Id. at 8.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. Judge Roane similarly argued that “the Constitution of the United States in almost 
no other instance, acts through the governments of the several states . . . . The great grievance 
complained of under the articles of confederation, was, that they acted only through the 
states . . . . To remedy this evil, an entire new system was adopted, by which the general 
government acted directly upon the people.” Id. at 35. 
 83. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 338.  
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those of the nation.”84 Accordingly, Justice Story observed that the 
Judiciary’s Article III powers were “part of the very same instrument 
which was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon states; and to 
deprive them altogether of the exercise of some powers of 
sovereignty, and to restrain and regulate them in the exercise of 
others.”85 He continued: “It is a mistake that the constitution was not 
designed to operate upon states, in their corporate capacities. It is 
crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of 
the states in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives.”86 
Despite Justice Story’s rhetorical flourish, he nevertheless 
avoided issuing a writ of mandamus to the Virginia Appeals Court to 
enforce the Supreme Court’s prior judgment, and instead simply 
reversed the Virginia Appeals Court’s decision and affirmed the state 
trial court’s decision.87 This may have been to appease Justice 
Johnson. Justice Johnson agreed that the Supreme Court had the 
final say on matters involving federal law but rejected the notion that 
the Federal Government could compel the States to act. On this 
point, he was emphatic: 
[S]o firmly am I persuaded that the American people 
can no longer enjoy the blessings of a free government, 
whenever the state sovereignties shall be prostrated at 
the feet of the general government . . . that I could 
borrow the language of a celebrated orator, and 
exclaim, ‘I rejoice that Virginia has resisted.’88 
While the Court has never retreated from Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee’s view of federal courts’ power to review state courts and force 
state officials to comply with federal law,89 it began to rethink its view 
of Congress’s capacity to control state legislatures by the mid-1800s. 
In 1842, Justice Story wrote in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that “it might 
well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of 
interpretation, to insist, that the states are bound to provide means to 
 
 84. Id. at 325.  
 85. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).  
 86. Id. at 343.  
 87. Id. at 362.  
 88. Id. at 363 (opinion of Johnson, J.).  
 89. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166–68 (1908) (upholding the power of federal 
courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional laws); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 784 n.13 (1982) (O’Connor, partially dissenting) (observing that federal courts’ powers 
to enjoin violations of federal law is “far different” from the power of Congress to coerce state 
legislatures).  
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carry into effect the duties of the national government.”90 Twenty 
years later the Court had become more resolute. In 1861, Chief 
Justice Taney noted in Kentucky v. Dennison that “the Federal 
Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a 
state officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform 
it.”91 And in 1868, the Court announced in Lane County v. Oregon 
that “[t]he people . . . established a more perfect union by substituting 
a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the 
citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with 
powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States.”92 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Justice O’Connor seized on the 
process federalism embodied in these early cases and began 
fashioning the anti-commandeering principle.93 She first articulated 
 
 90. 41 U.S. 539, 616 (1842). 
 91. 65 U.S. 66, 107 (1861). The Chief Justice was starkly prudential in his rationale, 
cautioning that “if [Congress] possessed this power, it might overload the [state] officer with 
duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the 
State, and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to 
which he was elevated by the State.” Id. at 107–08.  
 92. 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).  
 93. The Court’s development of the anti-commandeering principle parallels its 
development of another type of procedural federalism: state sovereign immunity. The Court’s 
first opinion on state sovereign immunity, Chisholm v. Georgia, was, like Justice Story’s opinion 
in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, strikingly nationalistic. Both opinions took the view that it was the 
People, not the States, who granted their sovereign power to the Federal Government, and 
therefore were competent to subjugate the States’ sovereignty to the national government. And 
from this conception of the Constitution’s nationalism, both opinions drew the same conclusions 
that Article III granted the Judiciary power over state governments. Of course, Chisholm was 
quickly abrogated by the Eleventh Amendment. However, in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution published in 1833, Justice Story argued that Chisholm was rightly decided and that 
the Amendment was a new limit on the Court’s Article III powers intended to protect war-
stressed State treasuries. It was not until the end of the 1800s that the Court recognized that 
state sovereign immunity was a structural limit on Congress’s power, not tied to the Eleventh 
Amendment’s limits on the Court’s Article III powers. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 
(1890). And like Justice O’Connor’s “rediscovery” of the process federalism embodied in 
Hunter v. Martin, Prigg, Dennison, and Lane County, the Rehnquist Court eventually 
rediscovered the central tenets of Hans—that state sovereign immunity was a structural limit 
embodied in the principles of the Tenth Amendment, not the Eleventh. See Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999).   
  The parallels between these two types of process federalism beg the question whether 
Congress could use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to commandeer the States in the same 
way it can abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976); 
see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (requiring congruence and 
proportionality for Congress’s prophylactic use of its Fourteenth Amendment powers); Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (requiring, and not finding, a clear statement from 
Congress that it intended to use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to override state 
sovereignty). However, since neither the Clean Air Act nor the Clean Power Plan were 
promulgated with an eye towards protecting citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment rights, I do not 
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the concept in a partial dissent in 1982 in FERC v. Mississippi, which 
rejected a Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenge to the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).94 PURPA required 
state agencies to “weigh its detailed standards, enter written findings, 
and defend their determinations in state court” without giving them a 
meaningful way to opt out.95 According to Justice O’Connor, this 
unconstitutionally “compel[led] state agencies either to function as 
bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government or to abandon 
regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to state 
authority.”96 
Justice O’Connor refined her argument in a separate dissent in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,97 which 
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery.98 She acknowledged that 
Congress’s Commerce powers are extensive but argued that it did not 
have unlimited means to effectuate them.99 Invoking Justice Marshall, 
she contended that Congress’s exercise of its power must comply with 
the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”100 “The spirit of the Tenth 
Amendment . . . is that States will retain their integrity in a system in 
which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme.”101 The 
Court, Justice O’Connor concluded, has a duty and an ability “to 
enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to 
complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstate 
commerce power.”102 
Finally, in 1991, Justice O’Connor clearly delineated the anti-
commandeering principle, albeit in dicta, in her majority opinion in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft.103 The pertinent issue was whether a State’s 
constitution, which required state judges to retire at a certain age, was 
preempted by the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.104 
Though she resolved the issue on statutory grounds, Justice 
O’Connor emphasized that if Congress were to attempt to regulate 
 
consider the intriguing question any further.  
 94. 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982).  
 95. Id. at 787.  
 96. Id. at 783.  
 97. 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985).  
 98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 99. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588.  
 100. Id. at 585 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 587.  
 103. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 104. Id. at 455. 
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state judges’ qualifications it would be unconstitutional because the 
power of States to determine their officials’ qualifications is “reserved 
to the States under the Tenth Amendment.”105 
C. Structural and Prudential Logic 
In addition to their historical and doctrinal arguments, New York 
and Printz both bolstered their anti-commandeering holdings with 
structural readings of the Constitution, which they demarcated with 
prudential considerations about the real-world costs and benefits of 
the doctrine. 
Though not perfectly coherent in their conception of the 
latticework of process federalism, New York and Printz seemed to 
agree on one point: Federalism is not a prohibition on Congress’s 
otherwise authorized exercise of its Article I powers, but rather a 
structural limit on the powers delegated to Congress in the first 
place.106 According to New York, “The Tenth Amendment . . . 
restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the 
text of the Tenth Amendment, which . . . is essentially a tautology.”107 
“If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth 
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the 
States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not 
conferred on Congress.”108 Printz clarified that the fact that the States 
retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” is “reflected 
throughout the Constitution’s text.”109 
 
 
 105. Id. at 463.  
 106. But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) (“In New York and Printz, we held 
federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject 
matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth 
Amendment.”); Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001) (arguing that the Tenth 
Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle “is best understood as an external constraint upon 
congressional power—analogous to the constraints set forth in the Bill of Rights—but one that 
lacks an explicit textual basis.”). Justice O’Connor probably would not have concerned herself 
much with the difference. “In the end,” she observed, “just as a cup may be half empty or half 
full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of 
ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative 
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States 
under the Tenth Amendment.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992). 
 107. Id. at 156–57.  
 108. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).  
 109. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 
245 (J. Madison)).  
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Thus, rather than itself being a structural prohibition on 
Congress’s exercise of its enumerated powers, the Tenth Amendment 
is better understood as a directive to the Court to determine 
“whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation 
on an Article I power.”110 Of course, the Court’s search for a 
justiciable federalism has a “sordid” past,111 but unlike its pre-1937 
attempts to limit Congress’s power with arbitrary, formalist limits on 
the Commerce Clause, or its short-lived understanding of the Tenth 
Amendment as a prohibition on Congress’s enumerated powers in 
National League of Cities,112 the new federalism of New York and 
Printz is purely procedural. Congress is not substantively limited in its 
exercise of its enumerated powers; rather, it is only limited in how it 
may exercise those powers.113 
Having structurally arrived at the concept of process federalism, 
Printz and New York outlined its contours using thoroughly 
prudential reasoning.114 For Justice O’Connor, the principle value of 
 
 110. New York, 505 U.S. at 157; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of 
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 639, 649 (1993) (arguing that New York’s process 
federalism is essentially a rule of construction that the Courts should engage in a M’Culloch 
style review as to whether a Congressional statute complies with both the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution).  
 111. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries: More than a 
Truism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 41 (Mark Killenbeck ed., 
2001) (describing the Courts’ ill-fated pre-1937 attempt to define a substantive limit on 
Congress’s infringement into State domains); Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 34, 73, n.75 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. 
Levy eds., 2014) (describing “dual federalism” as dying its first death in 1937). 
 112. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding an amendment to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012), unconstitutional because Congress’s exercise of 
Commerce Clause power imposed substantial costs upon appellants and displaced state 
policies).   
 113. Recently, however, the Court has sought to map out some minor substantive limits on 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers in the name of federalism. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
 114. Both Justices O’Connor and Scalia would likely stridently disagree that they were 
doing anything of the sort. Justice O’Connor stressed: “Our task would be the same even if one 
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our 
preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in 
the Constitution.” New York, 505 U.S. at 157. However, her repeated references to the benefits 
of state autonomy suggest that its advantages do matter. Additionally, as Chief Justice Marshall 
demonstrated in M’Culloch, structural constitutional reasoning works when it makes sense. See 
also CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1969) 
(“I am inclined to think well of the method of reasoning from structure and relation . . . because 
to succeed it has to make sense—current, practical sense.”); Neil Siegel, Commandeering and Its 
Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L.R. 1630, 1634 (2006) (“For a federalism 
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the anti-commandeering principle is its promotion of local political 
accountability.115 She noted that when the “Federal Government 
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear 
the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who 
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the 
electoral ramifications of their decision.”116 Federal coercion 
diminishes those officials’ accountability because they cannot respond 
to the needs of the local electorate. Federal preemption of state law, 
on the other hand, does not pose the same accountability problem 
since federal officials make their decisions in the public’s eye and 
“suffer the consequences” of unpopular decisions.117 
In Printz, Justice Scalia suggested that another type of 
accountability would be damaged by allowing the Federal 
Government to commandeer the States: Congress’s own. The 
Constitution, according to Justice Scalia, vests all the executive power 
in the President “to ensure both vigor and accountability.”118 This 
“would be shattered . . . if Congress could act as effectively without 
the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute 
its laws.”119 Thus, by forcing the States to administer its laws instead 
of the President or the President’s appointees, Congress could skirt its 
own political accountability that stems from the fact that the 
President is obliged to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”120 
Printz and New York recognized that anti-commandeering is not 
just politically beneficial. The principle also protects individuals 
against the aggrandizement of power by either the federal or state 
governments, alleviating the risk of tyranny and abuse by either. As 
Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence in Printz, “[t]he great 
innovation of [the Constitution’s dual sovereignty design] was that 
‘our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one 
federal, each protected from incursion by the other.’”121 This 
separation “is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of 
 
concerned with state retention of regulatory control, the relevant questions sound in a distinctly 
constitutional form of cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 115. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 168.  
 118. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.  
 119. Id. at 923.  
 120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 121. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
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liberty.”122 The ability of the Federal Government to conscript, at no 
cost to itself, state officers or legislatures into its service trenches too 
far into these personal liberties, leaving the citizenry vulnerable to a 
massive consolidation of power by Congress or, perhaps more 
credibly in modern times, the President. 
The Constitutional scaffolding of New York and Printz suggests 
three overarching things about the contours of the anti-
commandeering principle, which exist in some tension with each 
other. First, the historical arguments for anti-commandeering 
advanced in New York and Printz were not universally accepted by 
the founding generation, especially with respect to the 
commandeering of state officials. To the contrary, the Anti-
Federalists may have advocated for the commandeering of State 
officials precisely because of its potential to maintain state power by 
enhancing the States’ control over the implementation of federal law. 
The Anti-Federalists may have also thought that commandeering 
would enable States to maintain the loyalties of their citizens and 
state officials, which might otherwise shift to the Federal Government 
through federal patronage and employment. Perhaps for these 
reasons, Congress historically avoided commandeering state 
governments. 
Second, while not compelled by precedent, the anti-
commandeering principle has doctrinal roots reaching back to some 
of the earliest constitutional cases. The principle was based on the 
recognition that, because the legislative powers of the States and 
Congress overlap significantly, the Constitution’s dual sovereignty 
could only be retained by implying a procedural limit on each of the 
two governments’ ability to “impos[e] an obligation to obey” the 
other.123 
Third, the anti-commandeering principle seems to be an implied, 
structural limit on Congress’s Article I powers, rather than an express 
prohibition on the Congress’s exercise of otherwise enumerated 
powers. The limit stems from the Constitution’s commitment to the 
“separate and independent autonomy [of] the States.”124 The 
 
 122. Id. at 921.  
 123. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 8 (1815); see also Young, supra note 111, at 58 (arguing that 
the flaws of dual federalism’s commitment to separate substantive legislative spheres are multi-
directional; just as it is problematic to defend states’ federalism at the expense of Congress’s 
substantive powers, so is it problematic to overly police state infringement into traditionally 
national areas like foreign affairs).  
 124. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 700, 725 (1869)).  
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structural contours of the doctrine are informed by three 
functionalist, prudential concerns regarding the evils of 
commandeering, specifically that it: (1) interferes with local political 
accountability; (2) could interfere with the Congress’s own 
accountability; and (3) could deeply threaten personal liberty by 
consolidating too much power in the Federal Government. 
In sum, commandeering may have historically been understood 
to enhance state control, whereas the modern anti-commandeering 
doctrine views commandeering as a threat to State sovereignty, 
individual liberties, and political accountability. Both views, however, 
recognize the inevitable substantive overlap of State and Federal 
Government legislative spheres. These countervailing considerations 
suggest that the anti-commandeering principle is, at heart, a cost-
benefit analysis, balancing a recognition of broad national power with 
the autonomy of State processes. In principle, it has the salutary 
effect of increasing local and federal political accountability while 
safeguarding personal liberties. However, it should not be read too 
broadly lest it have the unwanted effect of consolidating too much 
federal power. 
V. THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE AND ANCILLARY 
STATE REGULATORY BURDENS 
Having explored the doctrinal and constitutional dimensions of 
the anti-commandeering doctrine, this Part returns to the question 
posed by West Virginia: whether the Clean Power Plan 
unconstitutionally commandeers the States due to the fact that, even 
if the States opt out, the federal plan cannot be implemented without 
imposing ancillary regulatory burdens on state regulators. Putting 
aside the ripeness issue with West Virginia’s challenge,125 the 
argument still fails of its own force because it contravenes the 
prudential and doctrinal framework of the anti-commandeering 
principle. 
Most damningly, West Virginia’s challenge would turn the 
structural and prudential rationales of New York and Printz on their 
heads, resulting in significantly less state autonomy, political 
 
 125. Since the federal plan has not yet been finalized, it may not be ripe for judicial review 
and it may not be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) 
(providing for judicial review of final agency action). On the other hand, the Court has not 
always required that a controversy be live and immediate when other considerations weigh 
heavily in favor of review. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 81–82 
(1978). 
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accountability, and personal security, because it would unravel many 
cooperative federalist regulations126 and lead to much more 
preemption of state law. As discussed above, the anti-commandeering 
principle already exists in slight tension with the Anti-Federalists’ 
vision of enhancing state control by filtering federal programs 
through state officials.127 But the two versions are not mutually 
incompatible precisely because anti-commandeering promotes 
cooperative federalism by requiring the Federal Government to 
internalize the costs of its regulations.128 This, in turn, permits a 
significant measure of state control over federal programs.129 In doing 
so, the anti-commandeering doctrine is able to have its cake and eat it 
too. 
Without the option to costlessly co-opt state governments and 
officials, the Federal Government must choose between preempting 
States entirely or incentivizing them to cooperate. But because 
federal preemption can be very costly to the Federal Government – it 
is often politically unsavory, expensive, resource intensive, and 
logistically difficult or impossible at times130 – cooperative federalism 
 
 126. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 127. See Siegel, supra note 114, at 1634.  
 128. But see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 696 (2001) (arguing that Printz “suggested a possible return to 
a vision of dual federalism and the possible invalidation of cooperative federalism regulatory 
schemes.”). Others, however, have convincingly argued that Printz and other decisions rested 
on a vision of “dual sovereignty” quite apart from dual federalism. E.g., Young, supra note 111, 
at 66 (noting that “the horse of dual federalism is dead, and we should quit beating it.”).   
 129. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 70, at 1285–92. 
 130. These are all costs on the Federal Government itself. Presumably, the Federal 
Government would also weigh the costs of reduced accountability and responsiveness, and the 
opportunity costs of failing to use the States as laboratories of innovation that also stem from 
federal preemption of local control. On the other hand, Professor Siegel has argued that the 
anti-commandeering doctrine might cause more preemption than cooperative federalism. See 
Siegel, supra note 114, at 1646 (arguing that “the unavailability of commandeering may result in 
more instances of federal preemption going forward.”). Moreover, Professor Siegel sees little 
difference between cooperative federalist frameworks like conditional spending and 
commandeering in terms of the regulatory control exercised over state governments. Id. at 1657. 
While it is true that with cooperative federalism, the State’s degree of discretion in the exercise 
of federal programs is formally dictated by Congress, the States nevertheless have significant 
latitude in choosing how to implement even relatively specific, bright-line programs. For 
instance, North Carolina’s virtual non-compliance with many of the EPA’s delegated 
environmental programs presents one powerful example of State autonomy within cooperative 
federalist arrangements. See, e.g., Lilian Dorka, Letter of Concern to NC DEQ, EPA CIVIL 
RIGHTS COMPLIANCE OFFICE (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3381929/NCDEQ-Letter-of-Concern-from-
EPA.pdf (expressing concern that North Carolina was violating federal civil rights laws in its 
implementation of the Clean Water Act); Keith Goldberg, EPA Threatens to Yank NC 
Permitting Authority, LAW360 (Nov. 17, 2015, 4:55 PM), 
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becomes a more attractive option. This option, as the Anti-Federalists 
once hoped, empowers the States to “tweak, challenge, and even 
dissent from federal law.”131 
But taken to its logical end, West Virginia’s argument would 
effectively destroy cooperative federalism as a viable alternative. It 
would mean that Congress (or federal agencies acting pursuant to 
delegated Congressional power) would be precluded from regulating 
in an area whenever it would have the side effect of triggering other 
state-law based regulatory burdens that would be shouldered by state 
regulators. Congress would be left with two alternatives: either 
preempt every area that might be incidentally impacted by a federal 
regulation or refrain from regulating overlapping areas of state and 
federal power altogether. Since the latter is unlikely, the inevitable 
result would be much more federal preemption of state laws, 
effectively unraveling the delicate cost-benefit balancing achieved in 
New York and Printz. 
Putting the prudence of the anti-commandeering principle aside, 
West Virginia’s argument is not supported in the case law or in more 
than a century of political practice. Congress has enacted statutes 
based on cooperative federalism since the early 1900s,132 which, as 
Justice Scalia emphasized in Printz, can be “‘weighty evidence’ of the 
Constitution’s meaning.”133 Many of these regulations, like the EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan, rely on state regulatory frameworks to ensure 
their effective implementation.134 And, like the Clean Power Plan, 
 
https://www.law360.com/energy/articles/727938/epa-threatens-to-yank-nc-permitting-authority 
(EPA threatened to revoke North Carolina’s permitting authority under the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act because of the State’s efforts to limit citizens’ access to judicial review of 
environmental permits).  
 131. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 70, at 1298. See also Heather K. Gerken, Our 
Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2012). Gerken explains: 
In cooperative regimes, states draw their power from their position as federal 
servants, not separate sovereigns. As administrators of the federal regime, 
states often have a great deal of discretion in carrying out federal policies. 
The policymaking space in which they wield power is not the separate 
regulatory carve-out imagined by champions of sovereignty and process 
federalists. Instead, state policymakers wield power in the nooks and crannies 
of the administrative system. 
Id.   
 132. See generally JANE CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM (1938) (discussing the 
burgeoning options for cooperative federalism in the New Deal era). 
 133. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 723–24 (1986)).  
 134. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (recognizing the Clean 
Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act as examples of regulations 
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these regulations would require additional intervention by Congress if 
the States were to decline to pick up the regulatory slack caused by 
federal implementation of the regulations.135 Yet the Court in New 
York expressly approved of these cooperative arrangements, noting 
that: 
[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private 
activity under the Commerce Clause, we have 
recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of 
regulating that activity according to federal standards or 
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. This 
arrangement, which has been termed “a program of 
cooperative federalism,” is replicated in numerous 
federal statutory schemes. These include the Clean 
Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.136 
Moreover, the Court has specifically declined to strike down 
federal statutes simply because they inconvenience the States.137 For 
instance, in Reno v. Condon, the Court unanimously rejected South 
Carolina’s Tenth Amendment challenge to the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act (DPPA), which restricts States’ ability to disclose 
drivers’ personal information without their consent.138 The Court 
acknowledged that “the DPPA’s provisions will require time and 
effort on the part of state employees” but nevertheless declined to 
find that it commandeered the States because the DPPA did “not 
require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own 
citizens.”139 Likewise, in Printz, Justice Scalia suggested that an 
“incidental application to the States of a federal law of general 
applicability” would only be unconstitutional if it “excessively 
interfered with the functioning of state governments.”140 The flaw 
with the Brady Act was not that it burdened States, but that the 
“whole object of the law [was] to direct the functioning of the state 
 
relying on State regulatory frameworks).  
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. at 167–68 (citations omitted).  
 137. See Weiser, supra note 128, at 698 (predicting that “the Supreme Court will not 
invalidate a federal regulatory program merely because it will consume a state’s time and 
resources.”).  
 138. 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000). 
 139. Id. at 150, 151.  
 140. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997). 
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executive.”141 Even crediting West Virginia’s argument that the Clean 
Power Plan will require time and effort on the part of state regulators, 
this incident is not the “whole object” of the regulation, and it plainly 
does not rise to the level of “excessively interfer[ing] with the 
functioning of state governments.”142 
Alternatively, it may be that West Virginia is using the anti-
commandeering principle as a back door to seek a new substantive 
limit on Congress’s powers. In other words, the Federal Government 
would be precluded from legislating in areas that are already heavily 
regulated by the States, especially core issues of state interest like 
power generation.143 The argument finds some support in Justice 
O’Connor’s partial dissent in FERC.144 Responding to the majority’s 
reasoning that the States “may escape PURPA simply by ceasing 
regulation of public utilities,” Justice O’Connor argued that States 
should not be forced to avoid regulating in areas of traditional State 
concern to avoid the burdens imposed by a coercive federal 
regulation.145 She stressed that “[u]tility regulation is a traditional 
function of state government . . . By taxing [the State regulators’] 
limited resources . . . and decreasing their ability to address local 
regulatory ills, PURPA directly impairs the power of state utility 
commissions to discharge their traditional functions efficiently and 
effectively.”146 
Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor stressed that Congress could still 
preempt the field entirely, an alternative that “[t]he States might well 
prefer.”147 Accordingly, it seems that Justice O’Connor was concerned 
more with the mechanism of Congress’s exercise of its power than 
with the substance. Moreover, to the extent that Justice O’Connor’s 
anti-commandeering principle ever contained any substantive 
components, she expressly disavowed them in New York, stating that 
“[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation 
directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the 
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ 
 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. For instance, in its Opening Brief, West Virginia argues that the Clean Power Plan 
“commandeers the States’ exclusive authority to regulate the intrastate generation and 
transmission of electricity.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 79 (emphasis added).  
 144. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775–96 (1982).  
 145. Id. at 781.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 787.  
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instructions.”148 Thus, to the extent that West Virginia’s argument 
leads to the conclusion that Congress is substantively constrained 
from regulating in “areas of intimate concern” to the States, it has no 
support in the modern anti-commandeering doctrine.149 
West Virginia’s best argument might be that Congress has not 
delegated to the EPA the authority to preempt the States in the areas 
of state law that will be affected by the Clean Power Plan, and 
therefore the federal plan necessarily relies on state cooperation in its 
implementation. It is true that if the States were to refuse to 
implement the permitting, ratemaking adjustments and other 
incidental regulatory burdens of the federal plan, the EPA would 
likely be unable to achieve the 32% overall carbon emission 
reductions it is seeking. It would have to go to Congress to ask for 
authority to preempt these traditional areas of state law. Still, the 
argument proves too much. If every federal regulation that relies on 
States to shoulder incidental burdens were unconstitutional, either 
the entire regulatory state would collapse or Congress would have to 
enact vast swaths of new legislation regulating areas that have 
historically been the domain of the States. More than 
commandeering, it would be an all-out annihilation of State 
autonomy. The anti-commandeering principle surely does not go that 
far.150 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Though not compelled by constitutional history or precedent, the 
anti-commandeering doctrine is a convincing structural and 
prudential reading of the Constitution’s commitment to dual 
sovereignty, which recognizes Congress’s expansive national power 
while retaining States’ procedural autonomy. It draws a bright-line 
rule, which makes it administrable in a way that the Court’s “sordid” 
pre-1937 Tenth Amendment doctrine was not. And it also enhances 
state autonomy, political accountability, and personal security by 
promoting cooperative federalist statutes where the State and Federal 
Governments work together to implement federal programs. 
 
 
 148. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (emphasis added).  
 149. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 8 (1815).  
 150. To the extent West Virginia’s argument has any merit, it is statutory, not constitutional. 
It might be that Congress, which has historically been relatively deferential to States’ control 
over their power sectors, did not intend for the EPA to exercise its power under the Clean Air 
Act in ways that would impinge on this domain.  
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West Virginia’s reading of the anti-commandeering doctrine 
would undermine all of these values. Under West Virginia’s 
understanding of the doctrine, federal legislation and regulations that 
necessarily imposed incidental burdens on state regulators would be 
unconstitutional, which would likely lead to Congress preempting 
huge swaths of traditional state law. Ultimately, this would 
significantly undermine State autonomy in ways that are not intended 
or sanctioned by the anti-commandeering principle. 
 
